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NEW MEXICO JOINS THE TWENTIETH CENTURY:
THE REPEAL OF THE MARITAL RAPE EXEMPTION
LISA DAWGERT WAGGONER*

When you have been intimately violated by a person who is supposed
to love and protect you, it can destroy your capacity for intimacy
with anyone else .... When you are raped by a stranger you have

to live with a frightening memory. When you are raped by your
husband, you have to live with your rapist.'
Spousal immunity from rape prosecution existed in New Mexico until

June 1991.2 The only exemptions to spousal immunity was for rape

occurring while the couple was "living apart." 3 In 1991, New Mexico,
along with four other states, modified its rape statutes and criminalized
rape in marriage. 4 Yet, many states still do not recognize the rape of
one's spouse as a crime.' New Mexico's criminal sexual penetration statute
previously exempted the rape of one's spouse from criminal prosecution

* Lisa Waggoner is an Assistant District Attorney in the Second Judicial District, Bernalillo
County, New Mexico, and was the principal lobbyist behind the passage of this legislation. The
author thanks Professors Barbara Bergman and Jim Ellis for their help in organizing and editing
this article and William J. Waggoner for his continual encouragement and support of the project.
1. Testimony in support of H.B. 516 to remove spousal exemption to sexual assault offenses
by Dr. David Finkelhor to the Judiciary Committee, New Hampshire State Legislature (Mar. 25,
1981). Reprinted in Rickenberg, Florida, New York, and Virginia Courts Declare Marital Rape a
Crime, 18 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 745 (1985).
2. 1991 N.M. Laws ch. 26.
3. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-9-10 to -11 (Repl. Pamp. 1984).
4. The four other states are Utah, 1991 Utah Laws 267; Montana, 1991 Mont. Laws 687;
Texas, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 662; South Carolina, 1991 S.C. Acts 139.
5. Although the laws vary among jurisdictions, most states have taken affirmative steps to
eliminate the common law rule. In some states, if the couple is living apart, has filed for separate
maintenance, or has met specific criteria, the exemption will not apply. In other states the exemption
is completely abolished for first and second degree rape while it remains for the lesser degreed
felonies. Another state imposes stricter reporting requirements for marital rape victims.
At the time the New Mexico amendment was proposed, the following states had some type of
limitation or restriction on prosecution of marital rape. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1406.01, 131407 (1989); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 262, 264 (West 1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-70b (West
1985); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 11 §§ 761, 773-775 (1987 & Cum. Supp. 1988); HAW. REV. STAT. §§
707-730 to -734 (1985 & Supp. 1988); IDAHO CODE §§ 18-6101, -6107 (1987 & Cum. Supp. 1991);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38,
12-12 to 12-18 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1991); IOWA CODE ANN. §
709.4 (West 1979 & Cum. Supp. 1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-3501 to -3502 (1988 & Cum. Supp.
1991); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 510.030, -040 (Baldwin 1988); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:42.1
(West 1986 & Cum. Supp. 1992); MD. CRIM. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 462-463 (1992); MICH. COM'.
LAWS ANN. § 750.520b (West 1991); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 97-3-95 to -103 (Cum. Supp. 1991); Mo.
STAT. ANN. § 566.030 (Vernon 1979 & Cum. Supp. 1992); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-503 (1991);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.373 (Michie Cum. Supp. 1991); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:5
(1986); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3128 (Purden Cum. Supp. 1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-507
(1991); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5402 (Cum. Supp. 1991); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44040 (1988 & Cum. Supp. 1992); W. VA.
CODE § 61-8B-6 (1989); Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-307 (1988).
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by the inclusion of four simple words. 6 The statute stated:
Criminal Sexual Penetration is the unlawful and intentional causing
of a person, other than one's spouse, to engage in sexual intercourse,
cunnilingus, fellatio or anal intercourse, or the causing of penetration,
to any extent and with any object, of the genital or anal openings
of another, whether or not there is any emission

....

7

The phrase "other than one's spouse" is called the marital, or spousal,
exemption. This exemption was present in the New Mexico criminal sexual
penetration statute,' the criminal sexual contact statute, 9 and the criminal
sexual contact of a minor statute.' 0 The New Mexico Legislature repealed
the exemption from these three statutes during the 1991 session."
This article briefly analyzes the events that led to the repeal of the
spousal exemption, and it also interprets the new law which now criminalizes rape in marriage. Part One of this article describes the origins
and traditional justifications for the spousal exemption. 2 Part Two examines and discusses how courts around the nation address the exemption. 1' Part Three begins the analysis of the New Mexico rape laws
by detailing the evolution of the rape statute and of the case law surrounding marital rape in New Mexico. 4 The last section documents the
concerns of the New Mexico legislators and how each of these concerns
was addressed. 5
I.

ORIGINS AND TRADITIONAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR
SPOUSAL IMMUNITY

The marital exemption for rape and sodomy is traceable to Sir Matthew
Hale, a seventeenth century English jurist. 6 Hale propounded that "[tihe

6. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-11 (Repl. Pamp. 1984). New Mexico law provides criminal sanctions
for a violation of this statute when the spouses lived apart or had filed a separatiofi or divorce
decree. Id. § 30-9-10(E). For spouses with no demonstrable intent of separation, the criminal sexual
penetration statute did not apply.
7. Id. § 30-9-11 (emphasis added).
8. Id.
9. Id. § 30-9-12.
10. Id. § 30-9-13.
11. 1991 N.M. Laws ch. 26. Senate Bill 5, sponsored by Martin Chavez in the Senate and
carried by Raymond Sanchez in The House of Representatives, passed the Senate by a vote of 410 and the House of Representatives 59-1. Governor Bruce King signed the bill on March 29, 1991.
Co-sponsors of the bill included Senator Tom Rutherford, Senator Janice Paster, Senator Manny
Aragon, and Senator Anthony Williams.
12. See infra notes 16-39 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 40-105 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 106-33 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 134-99 and accompanying text.
16. Hale was Chief Justice of the Court of King's Bench from 1671 until 1675. A book based
on his writings was published in 1736, M. HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN (1736),
and the first American edition of the book, PLEAS OF THE CROWN, was published in 1847. For
further discussion of Sir Hale's theories in this context, see Comment, Sexual Assault: The Case
for Removing the Spousal Exemption from Texas Law, 38 BAY.OR L. REv. 1041 (1986).
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husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself upon his lawful

wife, for by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath
given up her self in this kind unto her husband, which she cannot
retract."' 7 Hale's reasoning was that rape required a lack of consent and
the marriage relationship was a contractual obligation of irrevocable
consent.'" Thus, according to Hale, the rape of one's spouse was contractually impossible. This idea was adopted by the American courts. 19
Rape originated not as a crime against the person, but as a property

crime. 20 Wives were considered chattel, subordinate to the husband. 2 '

Fathers had a property interest in their daughters' virginity and husbands

in their wives' fidelity. 22 The rape of an unmarried woman destroyed her
value as a suitable bride and sexual mate.23 The rape of a married woman
was an infringement of the property rights of her spouse24 and a disgrace
to her husband and family. 25 Hence, once certain relationships were

formed, a man gained a property interest in a woman's sexuality. The
early purpose of rape laws was to protect men's property interest in
women. "The current spousal exemptions in rape laws are archaic provisions that stem from the infirm legal concept that a wife is the property
'26
of the husband.
Closely tied to the idea of women as property was the notion that the
identity of a woman merged with that of her husband upon marriage. 27
This concept of "unity of person" deprived women of much of their
civil identity. 21 Moreover, the concept made it physically impossible to
commit rape within marriage because a man could not possibly rape
himself.2 9 The concept of unity of the person, therefore, granted the

17. 1 M. HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN, 629 (1736).
18. See Comment, supra note 16; Harman, Consent, Harm, and Marital Rape, 22 J. FAM. L.

423, 424 (1983-84).
19. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Fogerty, 74 Mass. (8 Gray) 489, 490 (1857).
20. Comment, Rape and Rape Laws: Sexism in Society and Law, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 919, 92425 (1973); Comment, supra note 16, at 1043.
21. See Comment, Abolishing the Marital Exemption for Rape: A Statutory Proposal, 1983 U.
ILL. L. REV. 201, 202.

22. Comment, To Have and To Hold: The Marital Rape Exemption and the Fourteenth Amendment, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1256 (1986) (citing S. BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL 8 (1975)).
23. Id. at 1257 n.14. "[T]he demand that the girl shall bring with her into marriage with one
man no memory of sexual relations with another is after all nothing but a logical consequence of
the exclusive possession over a women which is the essence of monogamy." Id. (quoting S. Freud,
Contribution to the Psychology of Love, in 4 COLLECTED PAPERS 217 (J.Riviere trans. 1959)).
24. See Comment, supra note 20, at 924-25; Comment, supra note 21, at 202.
25. See Comment, supra note 22, at 1257. Recent studies, citing the 1980 Department of Justice
Crime Report, indicate that approximately 50% of all rapes go unreported. Other studies indicate
that as much as 92% of all rapes are unreported. See Massaro, Experts, Psychology, Credibility,
and Rape: The Rape Trauma Syndrome Issue and Its Implicationsfor Expert PsychologicalTestimony,
69 MINN. L. REV. 395, 421-22 (1985).
26. R. Schwartz, District Attorney, Second Judicial District, Bernalillo County, New Mexico,

Changes in Rape Law Clarified, Albuquerque J.,Dec. 8, 1990, at All, col. 2.
27. Comment, supra note 16, at 1043.
28. Prior to the passage of the Married Women's Property Acts, a married woman was unable
to sue or be sued, enter into contracts, make wills, retain her own earnings, or manage her own
property. See L. KANOWITZ, WOMEN AND THE LAW: THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 35-38 (1969).
29. See Comment, supra note 16.
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husband the right to deprive his wife of most of her sexual freedom
and force intercourse on his wife against her will. 0
In his Commentaries,3 Blackstone articulated the doctrine of "marital
unity." "[Tihe very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended
during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into
that of the husband: under whose wing, protection, and [cover] she
performs everything." 3 2 Blackstone's argument served as the legal basis
for the unity of the person principle.33 As a result of this marriage
contract, a wife was deemed to have irrevocably consented to sex whenever
and however her husband wished. 3 4 Given this framework, it is not a
surprise that marital rape was accepted and legal. Although the origins
of the rape laws are varied, it is little disputed that they were written
to protect the interests of men and not of women.35
Today, more sophisticated rationalizations replace Hale and Blackstone's ideas sanctioning the rape of a spouse.3 6 At common law, the
term "unlawful" when referring to rape meant the rape of someone
other than your spouse.37 This term has deep roots traceable to the
Biblical phrase "unlawful carnal knowledge." "[A]ny carnal knowledge
outside the marriage contract was 'unlawful.' And any carnal knowledge
within the marriage contract was by definition 'lawful."' 3 8 Based on this
definition, a man's forced sexual intercourse upon his spouse was permissible. It was these types of societal perceptions that formed the common
law which allowed forced sexual intercourse on one's spouse to be lawful.
Viewpoints have changed and courts are widely refusing the ideas of
Hale and Blackstone. Hale's and Blackstone's rationale regarding the
status of women and the marital exemption is no longer the basis for
justifying the sexual attacks of a spouse. Modern courts find that Lord
Hale's single statement, which lacks any authority, judicial or otherwise,
does not provide any reasonable basis for the exemption. 9
II. A NEW LOOK AT MARITAL RAPE
Public awareness of the marital exemption began in 1978 with a highly
publicized marital rape case. ° John Rideout of Salem, Oregon, was
30. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, and Feminism, 7

WOMEN'S

RTS. L. REP. 175, 177 (1982).

31. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES (1736).
32. Id. at 430.
33. See Comment, supra note 16, at 1041 n.18 (1986).
34. Note, The Marital Rape Exemption, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 306, 311 (1977).
35. Freeman, "But If You Can't Rape Your Wife, Who[m] Can You Rape?": The Marital
Rape Exemption Re-examined, 15 FAM. L. Q. 1 (1981) (citing S. Griffin, Rape: The All-American
Crime, RAMPARTS, at 28 (Sept. 1971)).
36. For an historical overview of the marital exemption in foreign countries see D. RUSSELL,
RAPE IN MARRIAGE 333-61 (1982); Livneh, On Rape and the Sanctity of Matrimony, 2 ISRAEL L.
REV. 415 (1967).
37. Warren v. State, 255 Ga. 151, 156, 336 S.E.2d 221, 225 (1985).
38. S. BROWNMILLER, supra note 22, at 380 (emphasis added).
39. See, e.g., People v. De Stefano, 121 Misc. 2d 113, 467 N.Y.S.2d 506 (1983); State v. Rider,
449 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 1984).
40. State v. Rideout, 82 Or. App. 747, 728 P.2d 584 (Ct. App. 1986) (table), discussed in 5
FAM. L. REP. 2164 (1979).
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acquitted of raping his wife, Greta. The trial drew national attention.
Shortly after his acquittal, the Oregon Legislature repealed the marital
exemption. This was the beginning of the national trend to repeal marital
exemptions from state statutes.
Since the time of the Rideout trial, several cases severely criticize Hale's
Doctrine and state that the marital exemption has no place in modern
42
society. 41 Of these cases, this article discusses only Warren v. State,
State v. Rider,43 and New Jersey v. Smith," and the cases which declare
the marital 46exemption unconstitutional, People v. De Stefano4 and People
v. Liberta.
In the case of Warren v. State,47 the defendant challenged the Georgia
rape statute.4 8 The Georgia statute is silent on the issue of marital rape.
The statute neither permits rape in marriage nor declares rape a crime.
The defendant was convicted of the rape and sodomy of his wife. At
the time of the sexual battery the couple was married and living together.
Despite the fact that the statute does not exempt marital rape, the
49
defendant asserted his historical common law right to rape his wife.
The Georgia Supreme Court explored the justifications for the marital
exemption and held that there is no implicit marital exemption within
the Georgia rape and aggravated sodomy statutes.5 0
The Warren opinion analyzed the common law marital exemption. The
court found the motivating force behind the marital exemption to flow
from an attitude based on the status of women in marriage and of the
long history of the exemption in the common law." The court reviewed
the traditional justifications for marital rape, dating back to Hale and
2
Blackstone. The court found that none of the theories have any validity.1
The court stated that today couples write their own marriage vows and
specifically decide the terms of their marriage contract. 3 The court opined
that no woman would knowingly include an irrevocable term to her

41. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Chretien, 417 N.E.2d 1203 (Mass. 1981); State v. Morrison,
85 N.J. 212, 426 A.2d 47 (1981).
42. 255 Ga. 151, 336 S.E.2d 221 (1985); see infra notes 48-64 and accompanying text.
43. 449 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 1984); see infra notes 65-71 and accompanying text.
44. 85 N.J. 193, 426 A.2d 38 (1981); see infra note 68 and accompanying text.
45. 121 Misc. 2d 113, 467 N.Y.S.2d 506 (1983); see infra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
46. 64 N.Y.2d 152, 474 N.E.2d 567 (1984); see infra notes 77-92 and accompanying text.
47. 255 Ga. 151, 336 S.E.2d 221 (1985).
48. The Georgia statute provides:
(a) A person commits the offense of rape when he has carnal knowledge of a
female forcibly and against her will. Carnal knowledge in rape occurs when there
is any penetration of the female sex organ by the male sex organ.
(b) A person convicted of the offense of rape shall be punished by death, by
imprisonment for life, or by imprisonment for not less than on nor more than 20
years.
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-6 (1988).

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Warren, 255 Ga. at 153, 336 S.E.2d at 223.
Id. at 153-57, 336 S.E.2d at 223-25.
Id.at 153-54, 336 S.E. at 223.
Id.at 155-57, 336 S.E.2d at 225.
Id.at 155, 336 S.E.2d at 224.
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marriage contract that would allow her husband to rape her.14 The court
found the protection from rape to be embodied within the equal protection
clause of the Georgia State Constitution. 5 Freedom from violent sexual
assault is a liberty 6 as defined by the equal protection clause and "protection to person and property is the paramount duty of government and
shall be impartial and complete." 5 7 Moreover, the Georgia court analyzed
the statutory provisions relating to the roles of married persons.
The Georgia statutes provide that the citizens of Georgia have without
limitation: (1) "[tjhe right of personal security, [and] (2) [t]he right of
"58 No longer must wives remain subservient to their
personal liberty ...
husbands and take the man's name and forgo their ability to acquire
property. Georgia laws provide that women are "entitled to the privilege
of the elective franchise and have the right to hold any civil office or
perform any civil function as fully and completely as do male citizens."5 9
The husband is no longer the head of the family with the wife subject
to him, 6° nor are women obligated to take their husband's surname. 6
The court found the justifications for Hale's reasoning nonexistent in
the state of Georgia. No rational basis exists for a modern marital
exemption.
There is no other crime we can think of in which all of the victims
are deniedprotection simply because someone might fabricate a charge;
there is no evidence that wives have flooded the district attorneys
with revenge filled trumped-up charges, and once a marital relationship
is at the point where a husband 62rapes his wife, state intervention is
needed for the wife's protection.
Relying on the language in Coker v. Georgia,6 the court stated that
short of homicide, rape is "the ultimate violation of self." 64 The court
upheld the criminal conviction.
A similar case arose in the Florida case of State v. Rider.65 William
Rider was convicted of the rape of his wife, Marion Rider. The trial
court concluded that the Florida statute, which is silent regarding marital66
rape, encompassed the common law doctrine of irrevocable consent.
The District Court of Appeals of Florida, Third District, cited Hale's
theory of the irrevocable contract and found Hale's reasoning "baffles

54. Id.
55. Id.; see GA. CoNsr. art. I, § 1, 11 , II, and XXVII.
I.
56. Warren, 275 Ga. at 155, 336 S.E.2d at 224; see GA. CONST. art. 1, § 1,
II (emphasis
57. Warren, 225 Ga. at 155, 336 S.E.2d at 224; see GA. CONST. art. 1, § 1,
added).
58. GA. CODE ANN. § 1-2-6(a) (1990) (emphasis added).
59. Id. § 1-2-7.
60. Warren, 255 Ga. at 155, 336 S.E.2d at 224; see GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-8 (1991).
61. Warren, 255 Ga. at 154-55, 336 S.E.2d at 224; see GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-33.1 (1991).
62. Warren, 255 Ga. at 156, 336 S.E.2d at 225 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
63. 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977).
64. Warren, 255 Ga. at 155, 336 S.E.2d at 225 (quoting Coker, 433 U.S. at 597).
65. 449 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 1984).
66. Id.at 904.
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all sense of logic." ' 67 That court agreed with the decision in New Jersey
v. Smith68 and concluded that it could not find any indication "that a
common law 'interspousal exemption' to rape prosecution ever existed
in Florida." ' 69 Citing the 1946 Florida case of State v. Herndon,70 Rider
stated that a court must interpret the law in the light of changing concepts,
reason and good conscience and 'can no longer interpret the law from
the back of an ass . . '''71
The first case in the nation to examine the constitutionality of the
marital exemption was People v. De Stefano.7 2 In De Stefano, the defendant violated a protective order and entered his wife's residence and,
at knifepoint, forcibly raped her. 7 At the time of the assault, the couple
was legally married and, although separated, neither party had filed for
divorce. 74 The defendant presented the court with the opportunity to
examine the marital exception. In doing so, the court found the exemption
violated the equal protection clauses of the New York and United States
Constitutions. As the court stated, "[N]o argument can be raised in
todays [sic] society to justify a husband's being exempted from raping
his wife." ' 75 Moreover, the court held that "[n]o governmental interest
and it
can be served by [the marital exemption's] continued existence
76
bears no reasonable relation to the class it should protect."
The most well-known and frequently cited case regarding marital rape
also challenged the constitutionality of the marital rape exemption. People
v. Liberta77 remains the strongest case against marital rape exemption.
In Liberta, the husband was living apart from his wife pursuant to a
Family Court order. 78 Under this order he was to move out of the family
home and stay away from his wife. 79 During a child custody visit, the
wife brought their son to the motel where the defendant was staying.8 0
Once in the motel room the defendant threatened to kill his wife. 8 After
he raped and sodomized her in front of their 2-1/2 year old
the threat,
2
8

son.

67. Id.
68. 85 N.J. 193, 426 A.2d 38 (1981). In Smith, the New Jersey Supreme Court stated that a
man could not invoke the exemption simply because he was still legally married to his victim, in
-, 426 A.2d at 45.
spite of the English common law doctrine. Id. at
69. Rider, 449 So. 2d at 907. Rider is the second Florida case to find there is no common law
spousal exemption. See State v. Smith, 401 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 1981).
70. 158 Fla. 115, 27 So. 2d 833 (1946).
71. Rider, 449 So. 2d at 907 (quoting State v. Herndon, 158 Fla. 115, 117-18, 27 So. 2d 883,
885 (1946)). These cases are significant because they suggest that when courts adjudicate marital
rape cases they are not confronted with a choice of applying or abolishing a common law doctrine.
Rather, the cases show that courts are confronted with a decision whether or not to adopt the
common law doctrine. The Rider case chose not to adopt the historical doctrine. In fact, Rider
goes even further by stating that the doctrine never existed in Florida.
72. 121 Misc. 2d 113, 467 N.Y.S.2d 506 (1983).
, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 508.
73. Id. at _
74. Id.
467 N.Y.S.2d at 515.
75. Id. at __,
76. Id.
77. 64 N.Y.2d 152, 474 N.E.2d 567, 485 N.Y.S.2d 207 (1984).
78. Id. at 158, 474 N.E.2d at 569, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 209.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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At the time of his indictment, the New York Penal Code contained
a marital exemption for the crimes of rape and sodomy. Despite the
exemption, the lower court treated the defendant like an unmarried man
and convicted him of the crimes.83 The lower court's rationale was that
the marital relationship was suspended and the couple was living apart,
therefore they were "unmarried" under the statute.8 4 On appeal, the
defendant claimed that because of the marital exemption he should have
been acquitted. The defendant's argument was that despite the order of
protection, he was within the "marital exemption" to rape and sodomy
and thus could not be prosecuted for the crime.85 Quoting Justice Holmes,
the court stated:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that
so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting
if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since,
6
and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.
The court held the New York statute violated the equal protection clause
of the New York and United States Constitutions.8 7 The court found no
rational basis for distinguishing between marital and nonmarital rape.88
The court systematically rebutted each modern justification for the marital
exemption and also rejected the analysis of the only modern court that
concluded that there is a rational basis for the marital exemption.89
Statutes which treat one class of persons differently than another class
of persons are subject to an equal protection challenge. The marital
exemption treats married persons differently than single persons and it
denies a married rape victim the same protection of the law afforded to
a nonmarried victim. In addition, offenders married to the victim were
protected by the law, while offenders not married to the victim were
subject to penalties and punishment.
When a statute treats two classifications of people differently, the equal
protection clause requires that this differentiation be reasonable and based
on "some ground of difference that rationally explains the different
treatment." 90 Applying this standard, other courts have found "no rational
basis for distinguishing between marital rape and nonmarital rape." 9' In
response to an equal protection challenge the Liberta court found "[a]
married woman has the same right to control her own body as does an
unmarried woman.' '92

83. Id. at 160, 474 N.E.2d at 570, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 210.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 160, 474 N.E.2d at 571, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 211.
86. Id. at 167, 474 N.E.2d at 575, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 215 (quoting Holmes, The Path of the
Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897)).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. (discussing People v. Brown, 632 P.2d 1025 (Colo. 1981)).
90. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447 (1972).
91. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d at 163, 474 N.E.2d at 573, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 213.
92. Id. at 164, 474 N.E.2d at 573, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 213 (relying on Planned Parenthood v.
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The Georgia and the New York courts are not unique. The Virginia
Supreme Court found the English common law doctrines and principles
behind the marital exemption "repugnant to the nature and character of
our political system." 93 In Weishaupt v. Commonwealth, the husband
and wife had been living apart and had not had any sexual relations for
over one year. Neither party had filed for divorce, but the wife had
consulted an attorney about divorce procedures. The court was very fact
specific and held that a common law exemption does not apply when
there has been a "de facto" end to the marriage. 94 The court did not
address whether the exemption is abandoned altogether, although it did
call one of the justifications for the exemption "absurd." 95 While the
Weishaupt decision does not go as far as the Rider or Liberta decisions,
it does reject the application of the marital exception.
The only case that concluded that the marital exemption has a rational
basis is People v. Brown. 96 In this case the defendant entered the victim's
apartment, threatened her with a knife, and forced her to drink vodka. 97
He sexually assaulted her and then passed out on her living room sofa. 98
Although the defendant and victim were strangers, the defendant challenged the constitutionality of the marital exemption. 99 Couched in an
equal protection argument, he contended that it is "an arbitrary and
irrational distinction between persons committing identical acts."' ° Although the court found that the defendant did not have standing to
challenge the marital exemption, it stated in dictum that the marital
exemption is neither arbitrary nor irrational. 0 The court said that there
is a "legitimate state interest in encouraging the preservation of family
relationships," and that this interest "supports the distinction between
assailants who are married to and living with their victims from those

Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976)).
Just as the Liberta court declared the marital exemption in violation of the state and federal
constitutions, the New Mexico marital rape exemption also violated the New Mexico and the United
States Constitutions. The equal protection clause of the New Mexico State Constitution provides
in relevant part:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law; nor shall any person be denied equal protection of the laws.
N.M. CONST. art. II, § 18.
The equal protection clause expressly guarantees equal protection of the laws. Id. This clause
expressly guarantees the right of liberty and further states that no person shall be denied equal
protection of the laws. Id. The marital exemption clearly stated that criminal sexual penetration is
prohibited except when the victim is the actor's spouse. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-11 (Repl. Pamp.
1984). This is an explicit denial of protection for married persons for which there is no rational
basis.
93. Weishaupt v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 389, 315 S.E.2d 847, 852 (1984).
94. Id. at 403, 315 S.E.2d at 854-55.
95. Id. at 405, 315 S.E.2d at 855.
96. 632 P.2d 1025 (Colo. 1981). The case has been statutorily overruled. CoLo. REV. STAT. §
18-3-409 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
97. Brown, 632 P.2d at 1026.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.at 1026-27.
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The court further stated that "the marital exception

averts difficult emotional issues and problems of proof inherent in this
sensitive area."'0 3 The court did not cite any case law, either in Colorado
or other jurisdictions, to support its finding. The court did, however,
rely on a 1954 law review article.' °4 Since the Brown decision, the Colorado
legislature repealed the marital exemption and Colorado statutes currently
make no distinction between marital and nonmarital rape. 10 5
III.

MARITAL RAPE IN NEW MEXICO

According to some researchers, New Mexico was one of only six states
in which the statute provided complete spousal immunity for sexual
assaults.' °6 Other research indicates that New Mexico was among the
many states that partially immunized spouses from the rape prosecution
of a spouse. 01 7

The New Mexico courts had already taken steps to narrow the scope
of the exemption and to declare the exemption no longer applicable in
today's society. With regard to the community property law, New Mexico
courts state that the "[f]act that two people are married does not destroy
their individual identity and make them one under the law."' 0 8 The family
law of New Mexico also recognizes that "[s]pouses are equal partners." 1°9
One court renounced Blackstone's theory of "unity of the person" when
it stated that "legal identity" of husband and wife does not exist in
New Mexico." 0 This revocation is a recent phenomenon.
New Mexico's rape law began in 1915. The law provided in relevant
part "a person perpetrates rape upon or an act of sexual intercourse
with a female ... through idiocy, imbecility, of any unsoundness of
mind . . . or when her resistance is forcibly overcome or when her
resistance is prevented by stupor or by weakness produced by an intoxicating, narcotic or anesthetic agent ....
,""' The law made no mention
of rape in marriage.

102. Id. at 1027.
103. Id.
104. Id. (citing Comment, Rape and Battery Between Husband and Wife, 6 STAN. L. REV. 719,
724 (1954)).
105. COLO.-REV. STAT. § 18-3-409 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
106. According to the National Clearinghouse on Marital and Date Rape, 2325 Oak St., Berkeley
California, 95708, the six states that completely immunized spouses from rape prosecution were
New Mexico, Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina and Utah. See N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 30-9-11 (Supp. 1990); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 566.030, 566.040, 566.050, 566.060 (Vernon 1979
& Supp. 1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.8 (1986 & Supp. 1989); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 1111
(West 1983 & Supp. 1989); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-658 (Law. Co-op 1985 & Supp. 1989); UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 76-5-402, 76-5-407 (1978 & Supp. 1989).
107. See supra note 4.
108. Romero v. Felter, 83 N.M. 736, 497 P.2d 738 (1972).
109. Flores v. Flores, 84 N.M. 601, 506 P.2d 345 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 84 N.M. 592, 506
P.2d 336 (1973).
110. Id.
Ill. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 44, art. VII (1915).
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In 1963 New Mexico first codified its criminal laws. 112 The reason is
not entirely clear, but at this time the phrase "other than his wife" was
added to the rape laws." 3 Following the enactment of the New Mexico
Equal Rights Amendment, the language of the statute was modified to
make it gender neutral." 4 The language "other than his wife" was changed
to "other than one's spouse."" ' 5 Yet, even at that 6time, the spousal rape
exemption was not recognized as discriminatory."
In 1975 the rape statute changed dramatically." 7 The law no longer
defined rape as an act of a male upon a female without her consent,
but instead focused on the concept of penetration. This law defined
criminal sexual penetration, provided that the offender could be a person
of either gender and established varying degrees of offenses." 8 This change
demonstrated a new awareness concerning sexual assault. It recognized
that men are also victims of rape and that rape can occur in many
different ways. The new law included forced sodomy, fellatio, and cunnilingus as acts of rape." 9 It also did not require that the penetrating
object- be a man's penis. Unlawful, forced penetration by any object
constitutes rape. 20 Even at the time of enacting this legislation,
however,
2
the removal of the spousal exemption was not considered.' '
In 1985 the legislature added a definition of "spouse" to accompany
the criminal sexual penetration statute. Spouse was defined as "a legal
husband or wife unless the couple is living apart or either husband or
wife has filed for separate maintenance or divorce.' 1 22 Even in 1991, the
phrase "other than one's spouse" is often read as "other than his wife"
in most cases. 123 Nonetheless, using this definition, New Mexico courts
narrowed the definition of "spouse" and have convicted a number of
men who raped their wives. State v. Brecheisen'24 is a case in point.
In Brecheisen the married couple briefly separated.' 21 The separation
lasted between one day and one week. 126 While separated, the husband
broke into the wife's home, took off all his clothes and knelt beside her

112. Daniels, The Impact of the Equal Rights Amendment on the New Mexico Criminal Code,
3 N.M.L. REV. 106 (1973).
113. 1963 N.M. Laws ch. 303, § 9-2.
114. This action was predicted in Daniels, supra note 112, at 112-13.
115. 1975 N.M. Laws ch. 109, § 2.
116. Daniels, supra note 112, at 107 n.13 ("[tihere appear to be no sex discrimination problems
in the New Mexico criminal case law which would require legislative correction").
117. Washburn, Rape Law: The Need for Reform, 5 N.M.L. REV. 279 (1975).
118. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-11 (Supp. 1975).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Washburn, supra note 117, at 307 (the author outlines the need for more reform in the
rape statute in three areas, none of which include the spousal exemption).
122. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-10(E) (Supp. 1990).
123. It's Not OK to Rape Your Wife, Albuquerque Tribune, Jan. 8, 1991, at A6, col. 2.
124. 101 N.M. 38, 677 P.2d 1074 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 101 N.M. 11, 677 P.2d 624 (1984).
125. Id. at 41, 677 P.2d at 1077.
126. Id.
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while she was sleeping. 127 When the wife woke up, she ran into her son's
bedroom to get away from him. 12 The husband proceeded to drag her
out of the son's room by the hair. 29 He hit her and verbally abused
her. 130 She tried to escape to a neighbor's home, but the husband grabbed
After a
her and forced her back to the trailer where he raped her.'
finding that the husband and wife were living apart, the court of appeals
affirmed the criminal sexual penetration conviction. 3 2 Had the prosecutors
not been able to show that the couple was "living apart" the conviction
may not have been upheld.'
IV.

REPEAL OF THE NEW MEXICO SPOUSAL RAPE
EXEMPTION

Modern views of marriage and the continually changing roles of marital
partners have destroyed the traditional reasons for maintaining the spousal
rape exemption. The marriage relationship is now viewed as a marriage
of equals. The notion of women as property has disappeared and the
purpose of our rape laws is no longer to protect a property interest, but
34
to protect personal safety, bodily integrity and the freedom of choice.
The New Mexico Legislature addressed five issues when hearing tesThese five
timony in support of the removal of the marital exemption.'
of
marriage,
the pothe
privacy
themes include evidentiary difficulties,
tential of a floodgate of litigation, the possibility that women will fabricate
'3 6
claims, and the common law definition of the word "unlawful."'
A.

Evidentiary Difficulties

Like nonmarital rape, marital rape is difficult to prove. To some
legislators lack of consent presented too many evidentiary problems.' 7
This is not a valid reason for sanctioning spousal rape. In most states,
like New Mexico, rape is second in seriousness only to the capital offense
of murder. 38 "The fact that rape statutes exist . .. is a recognition that

127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 43, 677 P.2d at 1079.
133. Id at 42, 677 P.2d at 1078. The Brecheisen court stated that "living apart" is a suspension
of the marital relationship and not just the existence of separate homes. Id.
134. Note, supra note 34, at 310.
135. Senator: I Am Not Pro-Rape, N.M. Daily Lobo, Feb. 28, 1991, at 3, col. 1; Don't Sack
Rape Bill, Albuquerque Tribune, Feb. 5, 1991, at A8, col. 2; It's Not OK to Rape Your Wife,
supra note 123.
136. Senator: I Am Not Pro-Rape, supra note 135, at 3, col. 1; Don't Sack Rape Bill, supra
note 135, at A8, col. 2; It's Not OK to Rape Your Wife, supra note 123.
137. Spousal Rape May Be Designated Illegal By Legislature, N.M. Daily Lobo, Feb. 13, 1991
at 6, col. 1; Spousal Rape Bill Moves Onto House, N.M., Mar. 5, 1991 at A9, col. 1.
138. Compare the penalties for criminal sexual penetration, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-11 (Supp.
1990) with those for homicide, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-2-1 to -9 (Supp. 1990).
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the harm caused by a forcible rape is different and more severe than
the harm caused by an ordinary assault."' ' 9 In marriage, the crime of
rape is no different. The burden of proof is difficult to prove in all
rape cases. Nonetheless, marital rape is a crime against the person and
should be sanctioned as such.
B.

Privacy of Marriage
Although originally all states either expressly exempted marital rape
from the statutes or recognized the common law exemption, modern
legislatures give great weight to preserving individual freedom from coercive sex. Now more than half of the state legislatures have taken
affirmative steps to repeal in part, or expressly abandon, the common
law exemption.' 4° The Illinois sexual assault statute, for example, defines
consent as words or actions by a person indicating "a freely given
agreement to the act of sexual penetration or sexual conduct in question.' 14 1 This language reflects the Illinois Legislature's concern for in42
dividual autonomy and bodily integrity.
The New Mexico Legislature recognizes that there can be violence
within the family. The legislature has enacted special laws to protect
family members who live in the same household from one another's
violent acts. For example, the Family Violence Protection Act 43 provides
that victims of domestic abuse may petition the court for protective
orders. 1 The legislature also enacted the Warrantless Arrest Act, which
provides that a peace officer may arrest without a warrant if that officer
has "probable cause to believe that the person has committed an assault
or a battery upon a family or household member.' ' 45 Finally, the state
established crimes of child abuse and abandonment as felonies. 46 These
statutes acknowledge the consequences of domestic violence and are designed to end assault within the family. In these circumstances the state
enters the privacy of the home; yet, the legislature and courts both find
this invasion of family privacy justifiable under the circumstances, given
the strong state interests involved.
Protection from spousal rape is another form of protection from family
violence. Indeed, government failure to enter the home in circumstances
of spousal rape legitimizes a violation of privacy. The right to bodily
integrity is the very foundation of the right to privacy. The invasion of

139. People v. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d 152, 159, 474 N.E.2d 567, 574, 485 N.Y.S.2d 207, 214 (1984).
140. See, e.g., Drucker, The Common Law Does Not Support a Marital Exemption for Forcible
Rape, 5 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 181 (1979); Note, 23 States Now Recognize Marital Rape as a
Crime, 16 CRIM. JUST. NEWSL. 6 (1985).

141.
1983).
142.
143.
Supp.
144.
145.
146.

Act of Mar. 9, 1983, P.A. 83-1067 § 1, ILL. ANN.

STAT. ch. 38,

§§ 12-17 (Smith-Hurd

Comment, supra note 21.
Family Violence Protection Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-13-1 to -7 (Repl. Pamp. 1989 &
1991).
Id. § 40-13-3(A).
Id. § 31-1-7 (Repl. Pamp. 1984 & Supp. 1991).
Id. § 30-6-1 (Supp. 1991).
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one's body in an act of rape is an invasion of that privacy; an even
greater privacy invasion than the entering of one's home. The state violates
the privacy of married women when it allows their husbands to rape
them without fear of prosecution. 47 The marital exemption permits a
man to violate his wife against her will. It denies her reproductive
freedom, 48 because she can be impregnated against her will. The exemption
also violates the married women's individual49 autonomy and denies her
her freedom of choice and bodily integrity.
Courts have recognized the constitutional right of a woman to have
50 It
an abortion and use birth control without her husband's approval.
is a "logical extension" of these rights to refuse a physical act that can
lead to pregnancy.' 5 ' The state must protect the right to bodily integrity
and the women's right to say no to sex. To assert that the sanctioning
of this behavior is a protection of privacy is hypocritical. Rape is violative
of the right of. privacy. Rape intervention can never be a violation of
one's privacy.
The fourteenth amendment governs state actions taken to regulate rape
and other criminal conduct. To create arbitrary exceptions out of the
criminal code constitutes state action for the purposes of the fourteenth
amendment analysis. 5 2 The marital exemption to New Mexico's criminal
sexual penetration statute is an arbitrary exception.' 53 State laws that
permit spousal rape and interfere with the right to privacy in this way
must meet a compelling state interest.5 4 Courts have held that the marital
exemption fails to even meet minimal scrutiny.'55
The second challenge to the "family privacy" argument is based on
the fundamental right to marry. Marriage has long been recognized as
a "basic civil right" and the choice to marry is one of our fundamental
freedoms. 5 6 Courts recognize that "a married women has the same right
57 The state
to control her own body as does an unmarried woman."'
protects unmarried women from the rape by a boyfriend, yet the marital
exemption does not protect the married women from a rape perpetrated
by her husband. The exemption forces all women to surrender either

147. Comment, supra note 22, at 1263.
148. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (holding that the right of privacy
protects married persons' decisions and access to contraception); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,
453 (1972) (holding that the decision to have a child is a fundamental element of the right to
privacy); Comment, supra note 22, at 1262-63.
149. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977) (holding that the right to privacy protects
"the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions"); Comment, supra
note 22, at 1263.
150. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold, 381 U.S. 479.
151. See People v. De Stephano, 121 Misc. 2d 113, 467 N.Y.S.2d 506 (1983).
152. Comment, supra note 22, at 1263 n.60.
153. See supra notes 48-102 and accompanying text.
154. See Comment, supra note 22, at 1263.
155. Liberia, 64 N.Y.S.2d at 158, 474 N.E.2d at 573. In Liberia the court stated "[tihere is no
rational basis for distinguishing between marital rape and nonmarital rape." Id.
156. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
157. Liberia, 64 N.Y.S.2d at 158, 474 N.E.2d at 573.
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their right to marry or their right to privacy from unwanted spousal
invasion.' 8
C. Floodgates of Litigation
Approximately fourteen percent of all women are raped by their husbands. 15 9 National statistics reveal that approximately ten percent of married women are both raped and beaten by their husbands. 16° Because
marital rape was not a crime in New Mexico until recently, statistics
were not kept and the numbers are difficult to ascertain with accuracy.' 6 1
Only an estimate of the frequency of spousal rape in New Mexico is
possible. At one shelter almost half (48%) of the women who sought
shelter cited continual rape by their husbands as the primary reason for
seeking protection.1 62 The total number of women at that shelter who
reported spousal rape was 350 in 1990 alone. 63 The director of the shelter,
Dannette Harrington, believes this estimate is low. Her explanation for
the underreporting is three-fold.1 64 First, rape is a deeply humiliating
experience and women are embarrassed to tell anyone of its occurrence,
especially a stranger. 65 Second, the majority of women from strong
traditional religious backgrounds believe they must be submissive to their
husbands. Third, and most significantly, they believe that it is their
husband's legal right.' 66
Despite the high number of spousal rape incidents, New Mexico prosecutors should not be inundated with complaints, just as they are not
inundated with date rape or long-term live-in relationship rape. 67 History
in other states has proven that a repeal of the marital exemption does
not flood the legal system with claims. For example, Oregon was the first
state to permit sexual assault prosecution of spouses.'6 In response to a
request for the removal of the marital exemption in Pennsylvania, the
district attorney in Benton County, Oregon, wrote to the Pennsylvania
State Legislature and described Oregon's experience with the reformed rape
law. He reported that there were only four spousal rape prosecutions in
Oregon between 1977 and late 1980, noting that "Oregon's prosecutors

158. Comment, supra note 22, at 1264.
159. Id. at 1258.
160. Id. at 1261 n.48.
161. Unofficial reporting at the Albuquerque Rape Crisis Center reveals that approximately 20%
of all rapes reported took place within a relationship, be it a dating or familial relationship (this
includes date rape and incest). Unofficial estimates at the Albuquerque Shelter for Domestic Violence
reveal that approximately 48% of the women at the shelter have been raped at least once by their
husbands.
162. 350 City Women Report Marital Rapes, Albuquerque Tribune, Jan. 7, 1991 at 1, col. I.
163. Id.
164. Id. at col 4.
165. Letter from Dannette Harrington, Ph.D., Executive/Clinical Director, Shelter for Victims of
Domestic Violence, to Mr. Bob Schwartz, District Attorney, Second Judicial District (Nov. 29,
1990); see also 350 City Women Report Marital Rapes, supra note 162.
166. 350 City Women Report Marital Rapes, supra note 162.
167. Interview with Art Weidman, Assistant Supervisor, Family Crimes Division, Second Judicial
District Attorney's Office (Oct. 17, 1990).
168. OR. REV. STAT. § 163.375 (Supp. 1990).
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have not been inundated by a large number of spousal rape complaints .... ",169
70
California criminalized spousal rape by enacting a separate statute.
In Los Angeles County, where the population is in excess of eight million
people, less than ten cases of spousal rape have been prosecuted since
the enactment of that law.'17 Other counties in California report the same
low number of complaints brought to the district attorney. 7 2 In a letter
to the New Mexico Senate Judiciary Committee, Karen Steinhauser writing
for Norm Early, the Denver District Attorney, states that since the repeal
of their spousal exemption, "I have not noticed any significant increase
in the number of marital rapes cases."'' 7 Given the Oregon, California,
and Colorado experiences, there is no reason to believe that reporting
behavior in New Mexico will be any different. Should the reporting or
prosecution rate be significantly different, this would reflect the growing
awareness of the severity of the domestic violence problem and may
indicate the aggressive stance taken by law enforcement and district
attorneys to end these cycles of violence.
D. Claim Fabrication
Even those legislators who understand the dramatic difference between
seduction and rape were troubled by the fear that a woman could falsely
accuse a man of rape. 74 District attorneys are competent enough to
distinguish between valid and fabricated claims. Courts have recognized
the ability of our prosecutors to handle this kind of situation. "Our
criminal justice system, with all its built in safeguards [should] be capable
of handling any false complaints.'1 7 , As stated by the California District
Attorneys' Association, "[ajlthough some false reporting of spousal rape
may indeed occur, it is likely to manifest itself early in an investigation,
or at least prior to trial since there are several stages in which each case
must be reviewed . . the preliminary hearing process enables prosecutors
to ferret out untruthful testimony.' ' 76 Rape is not a charge easily made
underreported and, if reported
and statistics indicate that rape is vastly
77
at all, rarely results in conviction.
The contention that women will fabricate a rape story in order to
achieve a more favorable divorce settlement is totally unfounded in this

169. Comment, supra note 16, at 1053 n.98.
170. CAL. PENAL CODE § 262 (West 1988).
171. Letter from Michael W. Sweet, Executive Director, California District Attorney's Association,
to the New Mexico Senate Judiciary Committee (Jan. 10, 1991).
172. Id.
173. Letter from Norm Early, Denver District Attorney, by Karen Steinhauser, Chief Deputy
District Attorney, Denver, Colorado, to the New Mexico Senate Judiciary Committee (Jan. 4, 1991).
174. Spousal Rape Can Lead To Trauma, New Mexican, April 14, 1991, at A3, col. I; Bill That
Would Make Spousal-Rape a Crime Gets Tabled, Albuquerque Tribune, Feb. 2, 1991, at AS, col.
I; Senator: I Am Not Pro-Rape, supra note 135.
175. Liberta, 64 N.Y.S.2d at 159, 474 N.E.2d at 574.
176. Letter to New Mexico Senate Judiciary Committee, supra note 171.
177. See Massaro, supra note 25, at 422 n.115 (in New York in 1971, there were 2,415 founded
rape complaints but only 1,085 arrests, leading to only 18 convictions).
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state. New Mexico is a community property state,178 which equally divides
community property, regardless of pending criminal charges.
The potential exists for many types of false criminal charges to be
brought. Yet, "[t]here is no other crime . . . in which all of the victims
79
are denied protection simply because someone might fabricate a charge." 1
False charges of theft, burglary, and narcotic possession are as easily
brought as rape charges, yet no one has mentioned the possibility of
legalizing theft, burglary or drug dealing. "Only in marital rape do we
remove an entire class of potential victims from the protection of the
law in order to protect some abstract possibility of a false claim that
the criminal justice system is unable to deal with appropriately."' 80 Further, wives can now bring assault and battery charges against their
husbands.' 8' There is no evidence that they are doing so vengefully.
The argument by legislators, who reluctantly voted to repeal the marital
exemption because they were afraid that women will fabricate claims,
dramatically demonstrates the chauvinistic nature of our laws. 8 2 Certainly,
the concern for a falsely accused defendant is justified. The stigma of
the rapist label can be psychologically and socially damaging. But the
overzealous advocacy of women falsely accusing men of rape is a return83
to the days of Lord Hale and to his views on the inferiority of women.
Even today in the rape trial, "the defendant enjoys the presumption of
1114
"..
The victim, on the other hand, "must prove her
innocence ..
innocence of what is essentially a presumption that she is bringing a
false accusation ... [h]er story must be corroborated by the circumstances;
she can be examined in public, not only on her veracity, but on her
prior sexual conduct and on any motives she might have for bringing a

false complaint. "185
When considering the criminalization of spousal rape, the California
Legislature also feared that such a law "would lead to a myriad of false
reports and abuse.' ' 86 This concern has proven unfounded 87 and "[o]n88
the contrary, the incidence of complaints is ... surprisingly small.'

178. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-2 (Repl. Pamp. 1989 & Supp. 1991).
179. Warren v. State, 255 Ga. 151, 156, 336 S.E.2d 221, 225 (1985) (emphasis in original).
-, 467 N.Y.S.2d 506, 515 (1983).
180. People v. De Stephano, 112 Misc. 2d 113,
181. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-3-1 to -5 (Repl. Pamp. 1984).
182. See It's Not OK to Rape Your Wife, supra note 123; Don't Sack Rape Bill, supra note
135.
183. See part I, supra, notes 16-39 and accompanying text.
184. Washburn, supra note 117, at 306.
185. Id. Most states have some restraint limiting inquiry into the victim's past conduct. For New
Mexico's rule of evidence limiting inquiry into past sexual conduct, see N.M. R. EvID. 11-413(A)
(1986 Recomp). Proposed federal legislation, S. 15, 102D Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), will strengthen
Fed. R. Evid. 412 (the rape shield law) and narrow the inquiry even further.
-U.S.
The United States Supreme Court examined rape shield laws in Michigan v. Lucas,
II S. Ct. 1743 (1991). Lucas holds that rape shield laws represent a "valid legislative
__,
determination that rape victims deserve heightened protection against surprise, harassment, and
-,
III S. Ct. at 1746.
unnecessary invasions of privacy." Id. at
186. Letter to the New Mexico Senate Judiciary Committee, supra note 171.
187. Id.
188. Letter (to the author) from Ira Reiner, District Attorney, by Bruce Campbell, Head Deputy,
Sexual Crimes and Child Abuse Division, Los Angeles, California (Jan. 31, 1991).
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E.

The Common Law Definition of Unlawful
As recently as 1985 in the case of Warren v. State, a defendant asserted
the common law position that forced sex within the marriage was lawful.8 9
In Warren, the defendant challenged his rape conviction by stating that
he had a common law right to force sex on his wife whenever he wanted.
In dictum, the Warren court stated "the word 'unlawful' . . . has been
widely recognized as signifying the incorporation of the common law
spousal exclusion."' 9 Other cases also define the use of the word "unlawful" as an incorporation of the spousal exemption. 19'
Due to this common law definition, the New Mexico Senate Judiciary
Committee considered removing the word "unlawful" from the rape
statutes. The committee recognized the New Mexico courts' definition of
the term as meaning "without excuse or justification."'' 92 The committee
therefore rejected the common law definition of "unlawful" and determined that the word was an essential element of the criminal sexual
penetration, criminal sexual contact, and criminal sexual contact of a
minor statutes. Legislators contended that removal of the word could
destroy the meaning of the statute. 93 Keeping the word "unlawful" in
the statute was necessary because without the word, individuals engaging
in normal sexual conduct could be guilty of a criminal offense. Thus,
the legislature established the word "unlawful" as a distinct element of
the criminal sexual penetration, criminal sexual contact, and criminal
sexual contact of a minor offenses. In this context, unlawful describes
the "manner in which the act was performed."' 94
Other evidence presented to the committee included evidence that the
word "unlawful" has been challenged in the New Mexico courts on many
occasions, and the courts have ruled that the term is not unconstitutionally
vague or overbroad. 195 But the most important and significant reason for
keeping the word "unlawful" in the New Mexico statute was that' the
legislators rejected the thought that the word "unlawful" would ever be
interpreted to incorporate the common law doctrine permitting rape in
marriage. '96
V.

CONCLUSION

Usually, societal attitudes are reflected in the laws. The New Mexico
criminal sexual penetration statute sanctioned and condoned sexual assault

189. Warren v. State, 255 Ga. 151, 153, 336 S.E.2d 221, 225 (1985).
190. Id. at 156, 336 S.E.2d at 225.
191. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Chretien, 388 Mass. 123, 417 N.E.2d 1203 (1981).
192. See State v. Larson, 94 N.M. 795, 617 P.2d 1310 (1980).
193. Hearings Before the New Mexico Senate JudiciaryComm. (Feb. 1,1991) [hereinafter Hearings]
(testimony of Senator Tice (D-Artesia)).
194. State v. Osborne, 111 N.M. 654, 660, 808 P.2d 624, 630 (1991).
195. Larson, 94 N.M. at 796, 617 P.2d at 1311. Larson also states that the term "unlawful" is
defined with common sense. The court stated: "We do not in any way believe that a person of
ordinary intelligence would not understand which type of conduct is proscribed." Id. at 796, 617
P.2d at 1311; see also State v. Pierce, 110 N.M. 76, 792 P.2d 408 (1990).
196. Hearings, supra note 193.
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within a marriage. This was not an accurate reflection of the feelings
and attitudes of New Mexicans. 197 Public sentiment asked for reform, 98
and in 1991 the New Mexico legislators met the changing attitudes of
their constituents by repealing the exemption.
On March 29, 1991, Governor Bruce King signed that repeal. The
Governor stated, "The Legislature clearly was saying that rape is always
a crime regardless of the circumstances and that is a position I share."' 99
New Mexico no longer sanctions the crime of rape in the marital context.
The elimination of the marital rape exemption is a positive step toward
societal recognition that physical and sexual assault is unacceptable in
all circumstances, regardless of the relationship of the parties.

197. See, e.g., Legislature Ponders Rape Bill, Sun News, Jan. 8, 1991, at 6A, col.
Consider Rape Bill, Portales News Tribune, Jan. 8, 1991, at I col. 1; Legislature
Marital Rape Bill, Las Vegas Optic, Jan. 8, 1991, at 1, col. 2.
198. E.g., Laws Need Strengthening, The Albuquerque Journal, December 6, 1990,
1; The Women's Agenda, The Albuquerque Journal, January 8, 1991, at A6, col. 1;
to Rape Your Wife, supra note 123; see also Gibbs, When Is It Rape?, TmE MAo.
1991).
199. Spousal Rape Can Lead to Trauma, supra note 174.
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at A12, col.
It's not OK
48 (June 3,

